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COMMENT
Standing to Sue: A Commentary on
Injury in Fact
Robert Dugan*
GTHE FEDERAL LAW of standing to contest actions by adminlistrative agencies has been the beneficiary of four recent Supreme
Court decisions,' which in turn have served as precedent for a spate
of appellate opinions.' These decisions display the courts' growing
* THE AUTHOR: ROBERT DUGAN (B.A., M.A., Stanford University; J.D., M.C.L.,
University of Chicago) is an Assistant Professor of Law at the University of Alabama.
1 Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970) (tenant farmers have standing to challenge
USDA regulation expanding permissible assignments of land diversion payments); Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970) (discussed
at length in note 3 infra); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) (taxpayer has standing
to enjoin expenditure of federal funds approved by Commissioner of Education for
purchase of supplies for use in parochial schools); Hardin v. Kentucky Util. Co., 390
U.S. 1 (1968) (private utility has standing to enjoin TVA from supplying power to new
municipal system. See also Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 400 U.S. 45, rev'g per curiam,
428 F.2d 359 (1st Cir. 1970) (travel agents have standing to challenge Comptroller's
order authorizing banks to engage in travel agency business).
2 Hahn v. Gottlieb, 430 F.2d 1243 (1st Cir. 1970) (tenants have standing to request
injunction restraining FHA approval of rent increase for federally subsidized low income housing); Tucker v. Hardin, 430 F.2d 737 (1st Cir. 1970) (welfare organization
and eligible recipients have standing to attack Secretary of Agriculture's rule requiring
communities to pay local distribution costs as a prerequisite to receipt of surplus commodities); National Welfare Rights Org. v. Finch, 429 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
(welfare recipients and their organization have standing to intervene in hearings designed to determine whether state welfare programs conformed to federal standards);
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (conservation groups have standing to attack Secretary of Agriculture's failure to take action
upon their petition to cancel the registration of DDT); Environmental Defense Fund,
Inc. v. United States Dep't of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 428 F.2d 1083 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
(conservation group, agriculture worker, and five would-be breast-feeding mothers have
standing to challenge HEW Secretary's refusal to publish a proposal to forbid further
use of DDT on raw agricultural commodities); North City Area-Wide Council, Inc. v.
Romney, 428 F.2d 754 (3d Cir. 1970) (citizens group has standing to enjoin implementation of a Model Cities Program until the program provides for sufficient citizen
participation); Peoples v. United States Dep't of Agriculture, 427 F.2d 561 (D.C. Cir.
1970) (group of poor people have standing to protest the administration of the food
stamp program); Whitley v. Wilson City Bd. of Educ., 427 F.2d 179 (4th Cir. 1970)
(parents of white children in previously all black school have standing to attack school
board's assignment policy on grounds that their children are bearing a disproportionate
part of the community obligation to comply with desegregation laws); Harry H. Price
& Sons, Inc. v. Hardin, 425 F.2d 1137 (5th Cir. 1970) (tomato wholesaler and retailer
have standing to challenge administrative regulation which established size limits on imported tomatoes and thereby restricted importation); Allen v. Hickel, 424 F.2d 944
(D.C. Cir. 1970) (local ministers have standing to enjoin maintenance of Christmas
display on federal parkland).
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willingness to embrace the notion of injury in fact as the dominant
element in the standing doctrine3 - a development which has been
3 The new law of standing emerges primarily from the Supreme Court's decision in
Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970); however,
one can clearly discern the development in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), and
Hardin v. Kentucky Util. Co., 390 U.S. 1 (1968). See Davis, The Liberalized Law of
Standing, 37 U. Cm. L. REv. 450, 451-56 (1970).
Data Processing was an action by a data processers' association to review the Comptroller's ruling that national banks could make data processing services available to other
banks and bank customers presumably served by the petitioners. The petitioners contended that pursuant to section 24 (Seventh) of the National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 24
(Seventh) (1964), these activities constituted illegal competition since the sale of such
services was not one of those "incidental powers ... necessary to carry on the business
of banking." After a careful analysis of the prior case law dealing with private interest
plaintiffs [Hardin v. Kentucky Util. Co., 390 U.S. 1 (1968); Tennessee Elec. Power Co.
v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118 (1939); Chicago Junction Case, 264 U.S. 258 (1924)] and public
interest plaintiffs [Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v FCC, 316 U.S. 4 (1942); FCC v.
Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940); Office of Communication of United
Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966)], Judge Lay of the Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit derived the following formula by which to distinguish
between the two: 'The primary search must rest on whether the plaintiff's status is one
which enjoys a private interest entitled to protection or is one which the law recognizes
to be of such legal significance to allow a party to act as a public representative for a public interest." Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 406 F.2d 837,
843 (8th Cir. 1969), rev'd, 397 U.S. 150 (1970). Judge Lay found that the petitioner
had no recognized private interest, and that Congress had not "seen fit within the National Bank Act to recognize any 'aggrieved person' to assert the public's rights." Id.
The emphasis upon "legal interest" proved fatal. The Supreme Court viewed Judge
Lay's formulation as a diluted version of the malodorous violated-right standard which
was unacceptable because it anticipated the merits of the controversy. 397 U.S. at 152-53
n.1. The second prong of Judge Lay's test was viewed as inapplicable in the absence of an
explicit aggrieved-party clause in the regulatory statute. Id. Justice Douglas proceeded to devise a standard which purported to avoid any anticipation of the merits. The
new standard established a two-part test: (1) "injury in fact, economic or otherwise"
must be shown (id. at 152] and (2) "the interest sought to be protected by the complainant [must be) arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the
statute or constitutional guarantee in question" [id. at 1531. The second element of this
standard enabled the Court to grant the petitioners standing by reference to the "general
policy" surrounding section 4 of the Bank Service Corporation Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1864
(1964), and section 24 (Seventh) of the National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh)
(Supp. V, 1970), although neither explicitly protects a specific group. 397 U.S. at 157.
The new standard differs from the prior law in two important respects. First, it
emphasizes the element of injury in fact. This is underlined particularly by the willingness of Justices Brennan and White [concurring in the result but dissenting in the treatment of the standing question) to make injury in fact the sole criterion. Id. at 167-68.
Second, the "arguable zone" element - despite its latent anticipation of the merits does represent a considerable expansion of the former rule which ostensibly required
that the complainant be able to point either to specific statutory protection or to a general
aggrieved-party clause in some relevant regulatory norm. The presence of the aggrievedparty clause in the regulatory statute authorized a private attorney general to question
the legality of administrative action. After the promulgation of section 10(a) of the
Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (Supp. V, 1970), the courts rebuffed the attempt to interpret the aggrieved-party clause therein as a general authorization of such public interest attacks. Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. McKay, 225
F.2d 924 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 884 (1955) (section 10 was viewed as
declaratory of the existing law;, it affirmed a party's right to contest an administrative
action only if he fell within a statute's aggrieved-party clause). The Data Processing
standard dearly relaxes the McKay result. See Davis, supra at 451-54. Under Data
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viewed as a desirable simplification of a complex area of the law.'
It is, therefore, somewhat surprising that neither the courts nor the
academic proponents of this approach have bothered to explicate the
notion of injury in fact and explore its broader implications as a basis
for standing.' In the absence of such explication, little is known
concerning the injury in fact approach except that the injury may involve not only economic values, but aesthetic, conservational, spiritual, and recreational values as well.6
The author finds it difficult to define injury in fact in such a manner that the new doctrine of standing, as based on such a notion, will
overcome the disadvantages of its predecessor 7 without, at the same
time, depleting the standing doctrine of all legal significance.8 More
important, the supposedly more liberal criteria invite a decrease in
judicial involvement and a rise in discretionary justice. The new approach, it would appear, is at most the expression of the courts' unwillingness to adjudicate difficult questions of substantive law.
I
Along with Professor Davis, two Supreme Court Justices9 and a
Processing, the complainant need not show that the regulatory norm contains an
aggrieved-party clause, but only that its "general policy" relates to the party's own
interests.
4
See Davis, supra note 3, at 457, 471; Comment, Competitors' Standing to Challenge Administrative Action - Recent Federal Developments, 48 N.C.L. REV. 807
(1970); Comment, Standing to Challenge Administrative Actions, 23 VAND. L. REV.
814, 820-21 (1970). But see Jaffe, Standing Again, 84 HARV. L. REV. 633 (1971).
) Professor Davis, for instance, advises that the injured interest need only be "legitimate" and that "the concept of 'injury in fact' need not be pushed to its outer limits....
[it] need not be rigid either as to what it includes or what it excludes." Davis, supra
note 3, at 473.
6 Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970).
7 The predecessor to the injury in fact test to determine standing is the legal interest
test. The test was enunciated in Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118
(1939), and provided that a person threatened with injury by governmental action does
not have standing to contest such action in the courts "unless the right invaded is a legal
right - one of property, one arising out of contract, one protected against tortious invasion, or one founded on a statute which confers a privilege." Id. at 137-38.
The Supreme Court in Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397
U.S. 150, 153 (1970), specifically rejected the Tennessee Electric rule.
8 The author recognizes that under section 10(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act,
5 U.S.C. § 702 (Supp. V, 1970), a plaintiff need only be "aggrieved" in fact to attain
standing to contest administrative action. Thus, the Act may be deemed to justify the
new injury in fact notion of standing. The difficulty experienced by the author, however, is the patent lack of explication and meaningful definitional guidelines by which
the injury in fact test may be effectively applied to the doctrine of standing. The Administrative Procedure Act also fails to provide such meaningful guidelines. In this respect,
although the Act is outside the scope of this article, the author's comments concerning
the definitional problems attending the injury in fact standard are also applicable to the
aggrieved in fact standard found in the Act.
9 Justices Brennan and White staunchly support the injury in fact test. Association
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number of lower courts 10 have adopted the proposition that injury in
fact should (and can) be the sole criterion for resolving the standing issue.' For Professor Davis, the mere presence of injury calls
for judicial scrutiny of the legality of the injury. 12 For Justices
Brennan and White, who proceed from the case or controversy requirement, the presence of an injury guarantees that the litigant
"can frame the relevant questions with specificity, contest the issues.
with the necessary adverseness, and pursue the litigation vigorously."'13 Both the Brennan-White and Davis arguments reject the
previous legal interest approach to standing on the grounds that
through its use the court necessarily becomes involved in an anticipatory, and therefore incomplete, consideration of the merits of the
case. These issues, it is contended, deserve full analysis and must
not be resolved, sub silentio, in connection with the standing question.14
of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 167 (1970) (concurring
and dissenting opinion).
10 See, e.g., Scanwell Labs., Inc. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Air Reduction Co. v. Hickel, 420 F.2d 592 (D.C. Cir. 1969). The court's discussion of standing in Scanwell, however, stresses, in addition to injury in fact, illegality and legislative
intent 424 F.2d at 865-68. Moreover, both cases arose out of an on-going business
relationship with the government. In this latter context, once one rejects the doctrine
of "privilege" [see Gonzalez v. Freeman, 334 F.2d 570, 574 (D.C. Cir. 1964)], there is
no more room for a consideration of the standing problem than there is in connection
with a purely private law controversy between two businessmen. One reason why
standing has become a complex specialty is that courts and commentators fail to distinguish among the various types of encounters between the state and the individual.
As a factual, legal, or historical matter, the encounter between the individual and government qua regulator is different from the encounter with the government qua provider, the government qua businessman, and the government qua competitor. Cf.
Dugan, Standing, the 'New Property,' and the Cots of Welfare: Dilemmas in American and West German Provider-Administration,45 WASH. L REV. 497, 498-502,
513-20 (1970). It is such variances which motivated Professor Jaffe to divide the analysis of standing between "public actions" and "private actions." L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL
CONTROL OF ADMmInsTRATIvE ACTION 463, 476-79, 481-85, 510-16, 524-27 (1965).
Consequently, it is somewhat misleading to cite cases involving an on-going relationship
with the government as authority for a particular proposition concerning the standing
of one competing with either the government or a member of a regulated industry.
11 For the two most recent statements of Professor Davis' view, see Davis, Standing:
Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. CBt L REV. 601, 613-14, 618 (1968); Davis, supra note
3, at 468-71. For an opposing view, see L. JAFFE, supra note 10, at 522-23, where the
author expresses the view that "grievance in fact" is an irrelevant and misleading consideration in determining the propriety of judicial review.
12
See Davis, supra note 11, at 613-18; Davis, supra note 3, at 468.
13Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 172-73
(1970) (Brennan & White, J.J., concurring and dissenting). See also Flast v. Cohen,
392 U.S. 83, 99-100 (1968).
As Professor Davis correctly notes, there is no necessary relationship between injury
in fact and the "adverseness" or "'vigor" of presentation. Davis, supra note 3, at 470.
14
See Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 16768 (1970) (Brennan & White, J.J., concurring and dissenting); 3 K. DAvis, Aimw-
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The nature of injury in fact is seldom discussed at any length
either in the briefs or opinions. The question is frequently resolved by way of presumption. In Association of Data Processing
Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 5 for instance, the petitioner
alleged, as its injury, that the ruling "might entail some future
loss of profits" and that a defendant bank was "performing or preparing to perform services for two customers for whom petitioner...
had previously agreed or negotiated to perform such services."' 6
These allegations did not involve injury in fact but rather a speculative detriment: the possible loss of profits and the disruption of relationships which seem to have been in the negotiation stage. Yet,
apparently on the basis of the allegations alone, the Supreme Court
found that "there can be no doubt that the petitioner plaintiffs had
7
satisfied this [injury in fact] test.'
A survey of the caselaw reveals that such loose treatment of the
injury in fact element of the standing doctrine is not uncommon. In
connection with economic detriment, courts have declared the
criteria to be satisfied by allegations concerning prospects of increased competition,' 8 the inability to undertake cogent planning, 9
the frustration of plans for expansion,2 ° the inability to contract with
2
the government,21 the loss of a prospective beneficial relationship,
the prospective loss of the "cream" of the petitioner's customers, 3
But see L. JAFFE, supra note 10, at
501-02, 508-12, 527-28; Jaffe, supra note 4, at 634-37 (the meaning of legal interest
in the public law context).
15 397 U.S. 150 (1970) (discussed in note 3 supra).
161d. at 152.
17 Id.
' 8 See, e.g., FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 476-78 (1940)
(established radio station challenges issuance of license to a prospective competitor);
Matson Navigation Co. v. FMC, 405 F.2d 796, 798 (9th Cir. 1968) (shipping line
challenges agency approval of merger of three competitors).
19 Curran v. Laird, 420 F.2d 122, 124-25 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (maritime union seeks
enforcement of statute restricting use of foreign vessels for shipment of military supplies).
20United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956) (licensee challenges FCC regulation prohibiting grant of new license to applicant who holds interest in more than five other stations).
21 Gonzalez v. Freeman, 334 F.2d 570, 574 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (commodities dealer
challenges order which debarred him from purchasing surplus government commodities).
22 Scanwell Labs., Inc. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859, 868-69 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (second
lowest bidder on government contract challenges award to lower but nonresponsive
bidder).
23 National Ass'n of Secs. Dealers, Inc. v. SEC, 420 F.2d 83, 100 (D.C. Cir. 1969),
vacated on other grounds, 39 U.S.L.W. 4406 (U.S. Apr. 5, 1971) (registered securities
dealers challenge order permitting national banks to operate openend mutual funds).
ISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE § 22.04, at 217 (1958).
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the mere presence of other competitors; 24 and the inability to exploit
a capital investment. 25 In some cases, the petitioners' mere investment in the litigation provides a boot-strap satisfaction of the injury
requirement; this is especially common in cases involving aesthetic,
conservational, spiritual, and recreational interests.28 Finally, some
courts have established an explicit presumption of injury in fact
is contesting the administration of
where an intended beneficiary
27
government largesse.
It is impossible to determine whether these courts are applying a
predetermined definition of injury in fact, whether they are constructing a definition out of whole cloth by way of example, or whether
they are doing both. If they are applying a predetermined criterion,
they have not elucidated their audience as to its exact content. If
they are constructing a definition by way of example, the range of
admissible examples remains unspecified. If they are combining the
two approaches, the proportion of the mix is not apparent. One
thing, however, is certain: All three alternatives presuppose the
existence of a metanorm which consists either of an unarticulated
definition of injury in fact or a set of criteria for determining the
acceptability of certain examples to the exclusion of others. Within
this metanormative framework is contained the operative definition
of injury in fact.2 8 Precisely what that definition is, however, escapes
identification. In the absence of a clear definition, courts are virtually unrestricted in determining the existence of an injury in fact.
The courts might, for example, use a purely solipsistic definition,
whereby an injury in fact occurs whenever the complainant feels
displeasure. Alternatively, a third party might be called in to determine whether or not the complainant has suffered injury. Another
24

Webster Groves Trust Co. v. Saxon, 370 F.2d 381, 383, 388 (8th Cir. 1966)
(established banks seek to enjoin operation of newly chartered competitor).
25
Atchinson, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Summerfield, 229 F.2d 777, 779 (D.C. Cir. 1955),
cert. denied, 351 U.S. 926 (1956) (railroad challenges experimental program of carrying ordinary first class mail by air).
26 Citizens Comm. for Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 425 F.2d 97, 103 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 949 (1970) (local and national conservation groups seek to enjoin

highway construction and issuance of construction permits in absence of congressional
consent); Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994,
1005-06 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (broadcast listeners seek to intervene in license renewal proceedings and protest the licensee's racial and religious discrimination in its broadcasting practices).
27
Tucker v. Hardin, 430 F.2d 737, 739 (1st Cir. 1970); Peoples v.'United States
Deplt of Agriculture, 427 F.2d 561, 563-64 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (in both cases, potential
recipients challenge administration of food stamp program).
28
See generally M. BLACK, LANGUAGE AND PHILOSOPHY 25-40 (1949); L.
COHEN, THE DIvERsITY OF MEANING 25-50 (1962).

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22: 256

alternative, and a variation of the latter approach, might be referral
to a less personal arbiter of injury - for instance, the proverbial
market,2 9 where injury consists of a change in market value between
two points in time. Finally, the court might use injury in fact as a
policy variable, applying the label to a situation whenever necessary
to arrive at a socially desirable result - social desirability being
determined in accordance with a particular set of metanorms. °
These different possibilities must be kept in mind when considering the advantage claimed for the injury in fact approach: that it
enables the court to satisfy the case or controversy requirement without anticipating the merits of the controversy."' This claim is usually stated as a general proposition without any reference to the particular metanorm which necessarily accompanies the application of
the injury in fact criterion.3 2 Such a general proposition is justified
only if both satisfaction of the case or controversy requirement and
nonanticipation of the merits may be achieved without depending
upon the adoption of a particular set of metanorms. Therefore,
the validity of the general proposition can be disproved by a counterexample in which a particular definition of injury entails an anticipation of the merits.
II
Using facts similar to those in Data Processing, such a counterexample can be developed. Assume the existence of a regulated
industry whose range of business activities is restricted by statute to
29 Defining a particular legal concept by use of alternative approaches is not uncommon in the law; an example is the controversy with respect to the objective versus subjective definition of "good faith." See Summers, "Good Faith" in General Contract
Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195,
198, 207 (1968).
3
0Manipulation of labels in such fashion has frequently been observed in commercial law. See, e.g., G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 35.4,
at 929-31 (1965) (manipulation of the "binding commitment" concept in connection
with the enforcement of future advance clauses in security agreements); Gilmore, The
Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63 YALE L.J. 1057, 1059-60 (1954)
(manipulation of the "voidable title" concept).
31 See text accompanying note 14 supra.
32 Professor Davis in his recent article, acknowledges the existence of relevant metanorms: "The only problems about standing should be what interests deserve protection
against injury ....
A person whose legitimate interest is injured in fact should have
standing .... The guide ... should be a judicial judgment as to whether the interest
asserted is in the circumstances deserving of judicial protection." Davis, supra note 3,
at 468,472-73 (emphasis added and omitted).
Professor Davis, however, fails to identify any particular metanorm to which he
might be referring, with the possible exception of his allusion to discernible legislative
intent. See id. at 473.
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manufacturing and selling certain goods and services. A number of
firms in the industry develop a byproduct for which there exists a
ready market. At present, this secondary market is occupied by a
dozen indigenous firms operating under conditions which are reasonably competitive. There are still profit opportunities in this secondary market for an efficient firm. Unfortunately, transactions involving the particular byproduct are not among those in which the
regulated industry is permitted to engage under the relevant statute.
The statute and regulations may either explicitly forbid such activity,
restrict the industry to specific enumerated activities, or simply adumbrate the general areas of permissible activity so as to raise serious
doubt as to whether or not the industry may market its byproduct."
Suppose, finally, that entry by the regulated firms into the byproduct
market will cut the net revenues of the indigenous firms by 25 percent. Such a prospective drop in revenue is frequently presumed
to satisfy the injury in fact element of the standing doctrine."4 The
presumption, however, is valid only so far as it enables the court
to satisfy the case or controversy requirement without anticipating
the merits, thereby supporting the claimed advantages of the injury
in fact approach.
Within the framework of the above fact situation, there exists a
perfectly respectable definition of injury under which such a presumption cannot be justified. For example, let us define "injury" as
a change in market value. An injury will result only if the value of
the object prior to the allegedly injurious event is greater than the
value measured after the event. Generally, value is measured by
reference to the market in which the particular item is bought and
sold (for instance, the market value of damaged automobiles is less
than that of new automobiles). A value differential is recorded as an
injury incurred.

5

The value of a firm, and changes therein, can be established
3a Section 24 (Seventh) of the National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh)
(Supp. V, 1970), and section 4 of the Bank Service Corporation Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1864
(1964), reviewed in DataProcessing, 397 U.S. at 157, are of the latter type. Compare,
for example, the vague statutory language of section 4 of the Bank Service Corporation
Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1864 (1964) ("No bank service corporation may engage in any activity other than the performance of bank services for banks"), with the more specific
statutory prohibitions invoked in Hardin v. Kentucky Util. Co., 390 U.S. 1, 3 (1968),
and National Ass'n of Secs. Dealers, Inc. v. SEC, F.2d 83, 87-90 (D.C. Cir. 1969),
vacated on other grounds, 39 U.S.L.W. 4406 (U.S. Apr. 5, 1971).
3
4 See Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152
(1970). See also cases cited in notes 18-24 supra.
35 See 5 A. CoRBiN, CoNTRACrS §§ 1003-04, at 36-52 (1964); 2 F. HARPER &
F. JAMus, TORTs § 25.6, at 1310 (1956).
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by reference to a particular market. Assume, for purposes of simplification, that the firm in question has been financed solely through
the sale of equity securities. By reference to the outstanding securities, the value of the firm can be ascertained both before and after
the injurious event. 6 A drop in revenues to the firm may, but does
not necessarily, entail an injury. The existence of an injury - herein
defined as a decrease in value - will depend upon the reaction of
those individuals whose demand for the firm's securities determines
their value before and after the injurious event.
A differential will appear only if the change in revenues does not
accord with the expectations of the investors.3 7 There are two possible extremes. At one extreme, a decrease in revenue is foreseen
long before it actually occurs. Under such conditions, the allegedly
injurious event will not entail any change in the firm's value; the
investors, having expected the change, will have made allowance
therefore in their demand for the firm's equities. At the other extreme, the change in revenue is wholly unexpected. In this situation,
the injurious event will lead investors to revise their expectations,
their demand for the firm's securities will shift accordingly, and the
market will record a change in the firm's value. This particular definition of detriment makes the fact of injury inseparable from the
past and revised expectations of individuals.
These expectations, which eventually determine the value of a
firm (and, hence, the occurrence of "injury"), will be influenced by
the statutory norms governing the present and prospective business
activities of the firm. A statutory monopoly, for instance, undoubtedly provides a basis for investor expectations. Should the administrator suddenly, in violation of the statute, permit entry by an outside firm, the resulting drop in revenues of a firm previously enjoying
the monopoly would probably be accompanied by a drop in the
market value of its securities. On the other hand, the total absence of
any statutory or administrative norm providing for a monopoly will
lead investors to anticipate the possibility of future entry when they
bid for the firm's securities. Thus, subsequent entry will entail a
considerably smaller decline in the market value than would have
36

See C. HUBBARD & C. HAWKINS, THEORY OF VALUATION

75-78, 150-60

(1969).
37

All but the most elementary models of price determination make explicit allowance for expectation and uncertainty. See, e.g., M. BAILEY, NATIONAL INCOME AND
THE PRICE LEVEL 49-56 (1962) (microeconomic model); 0. BROWNLEE & J. BUTTRICK,
PRODUCER, CONSUMER AND SOCIAL CHOICE 137-40 (1968) (microeconomic models).
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occurred in the presence of a ,clear legislative grant of a monopoly
right.
Most examples, however, fall somewhere between the above extremes: A firm may enjoy indirect protection by virtue of a statute
which limits another business to enumerated activities; 8 it may be
the beneficiary of an exclusive local or state monopoly which can, at
some future date, be preempted or superseded by a federal program;3 9 or, its activities may be the subject matter of rather ambiguous statutory language which has been interpreted in such a fashion
so as to exclude competitors. In all these cases, both the statutes
and their administrative application will influence the expectations
of investors. It is by way of these expectations that the existence or
nonexistence of injury comes to depend upon the ambient statutory
norms and administrative practices under those norms. These norms
and practices relate directly to the merits of the controversy.
Given the above definition of injury, the court cannot avoid an
anticipatory consideration of the merits in determining whether or
not the complainant has suffered injury in fact. Proof of injury
would require a showing that the value of the firm decreased in response to the administrator's action. In light of the many other
factors which influence the daily demand for a firm's securities, such
a showing of causation would be formidable. This would be espedally true where, at the time of an attack upon prospective administrative action, the market had not as yet registered any change in
value. To avoid the difficulties in attempting to determine a present
injury, a court would tend to start at the other end of the causal
chain: An actual or probable change in value may be presumed if
the expectations of the complainant relate to the administrative act
under consideration. 0 This presumption is justified only if the expectations do in fact relate to legal norms or administrative practices.
It is difficult, however, to corroborate whether or not the plaintiff
or group of plaintiffs did in fact build up expectations in reference
to a particular norm. In the absence of such corroborative evidence,
the court will look to whether the norm could generate expectations,
and, in doing so, take into consideration the value differentials (injuries) alleged by the complainant. In this fashion, the ultimate
test for injury in fact tends to become identical with the second element of the Data Processing standard: "whether the interest sought
88

See cases cited note 33 supra & accompanying text.
See Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118 (1939).
40 Many courts do in fact resolve the injury in fact issue by way of presumption.
See, e.g., cases cited notes 18-24, 27 supra & accompanying text.
89

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22: 256

to be protected by the complainant is arguably within the zone of
interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional
guarantee in question."'" And such considerations almost always
anticipate the merits of the controversy.
III
The foregoing discussion sets forth one definition of detriment
which contradicts the flat assertion that injury in fact avoids any
consideration of the normative problems comprising the merits of
the case. Indeed, the counterexample leads to a breakdown of the
two-part test for standing enunciated in Data Processing, and reveals the "arguable zone" element as the only operative part of the
standard. The counterexample makes it incumbent upon the proponents of the injury in fact approach to come forth with a specific
definition of injury in fact which will both satisfy the case or controversy requirement and avoid entanglement in the merits of the
case.
Some possible alternatives to the value-differential definition of
injury were mentioned briefly at the outset of the discussion: 42 (1)
let the complainant alone determine whether or not he has been injured; (2) let a third party make that determination on the basis of
his own sensibilities; (3) permit the courts to apply the "injury"
label whenever it will enable them to satisfy the case or controversy
requirement along the way to a socially desirable result. The second
and third possibilities become identical if the sensibilities of the court
and third party are both considered a function of social desirability.
This assumption leaves two definitions of injury: a solipsistic definition and a policy-oriented definition.
There has been little serious discussion regarding the sufficiency
of the solipsistic definition. This is surprising in view of the fact
that - as a logical matter - it is the only approach which does not
anticipate the merits of the controversy. With the litigant's allegation of an affected interest (be it economic, aesthetic, political, or
whatever) accepted as a sufficient indicium of the existence of injury,
no attempt need be made to determine whether the injury or alleged
injury enjoyed the proper connection with the legal duties or norms
in question. That courts have, in practice, adopted the solipsistic approach would seem apparent when considering those cases in which
41397 U.S. at 153. See discussion in note 3 supra.
42
See text accompanying notes 28-30 supra.

19711

STANDING TO SUE

the plaintiffs are seldom asked to prove their injury.43 Moreover,
the courts stress that injury may involve the frustration of nearly any
conceivable interest - economic, spiritual, conservational, or recreational.4 4 This broad definition of "interest," when coupled with the
absence of a proof requirement, tends to make the litigant's mere allegations dispositive of the injury element of the standing doctrine.
Opponents of the solipsistic approach would presumably argue
the likelihood of spurious suits, inadequate presentation of the underlying legal issues, overrun courts and crowded dockets, and declaratory judgments on abstract constitutional questions.. However, to
the extent that these objections involve empirical questions (crowded
dockets, inadequate presentation), no evidence exists either for or
against the solipsistic definition 5 -And insofar as the objections
derive from higher-order legal concepts, their validity depends upon
the yet unexplored meaning of higher-order principles themselves:
for example, can a contest be abstract or spurious when the complainant thinks he is injured? 46 In view of this lack of evidence and
meaning, and in the absence of an explicit definition of injury in
fact, the solipsistic definition affords a valid means by which the
mere voluntary presence of the complainant and his allegations of
injury are sufficient to insure the necessary degree of adversity to
satisfy the case or controversy requirement without requiring consideration of the merits.
43

8See Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970);

cases cited notes 18-25 supra & accompanying text.
In their separate concurring and dissenting opinion in Data Processing, Justices
Brennan and White seem to explicitly adopt the solipsistic definition: "[For purposes
of standing, it is sufficient that a plaintiff allege damnun absque injuria, that is, he has
only to allege that he has suffered harm as a result of the defendant's action." 397 U.S.
at 172 n.5.
Professor Davis also adopts a solipsistic definition; however, he would limit it to
require a consideration of the "legitimacy" or "deservingness" of the plaintiff's interest.
Davis, supra note 3, at 472-73. Later in the course of their opinion, Justices Brennan
and White impose a similar limitation on their definition. 397 U.S. at 175 n.10.
44 Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154
(1970); see cases cited notes 18-25 supra.
45
But cf. Citizens Comm. for Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 425 F.2d 97, 103 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 949 (1970); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC,
354 F.2d 608, 617 (2d Cit. 1965) (litigation cost is deterrent to overrunning the
courts with frivolous actions).
46
See Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994,
1005 (D.C. Cir. 1966), where the court invited the agency to specify such higher-order
restraints (concerning the representative nature of the intervenor and the amount of intervention feasible in light of administrative exigencies) in the form of regulations for
limiting listener intervention in license proceedings. Only Professor Jaffe attempts to
identify and explicate these higher-order considerations. See L. JAFFE, supra note 10,
at 484-89,524-27; Jaffe, supra note 4, at 634-37.
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Under the policy-oriented definition, the desirability of higherorder social goals alone determines whether or not to apply the label
of injury in fact. In the absence of an explicit model which describes the interrelationships between the instrument and target variables, the application or nonapplication of the policy-oriented definition to a particular plaintiff necessarily appears obscure if not
purely arbitrary. The vitality of the standing doctrine as an instrument for discriminating between plaintiffs can be maintained only by
requiring the court to consider the "legitimacy" of the interest alleged to have been injured 47 - the second prong of the Data Processing test.48 In the context of the Brennan-White-Davis approach,
however, such considerations would be impermissible because they
entail an anticipation of the merits.4 9
Although the solipsistic definition of injury in fact avoids anticipation of the merits and the policy-oriented definition may do the
same, by doing so they create certain dislocations: The standing
doctrine is reduced to a tautology, other doctrines of justiciability
come under pressure, and substantive issues receive less, rather than
more, consideration by the courts. Furthermore, to the extent that
either definition is adopted as the sole criterion for resolving the
standing issue, it simplifies the law of standing to such a degree that
it ceases to be a very meaningful legal doctrine at all.50
Proponents of the injury in fact standard, however, have argued
that such simplification of the standing doctrine is of no consequence.
Other criteria exist - ripeness, exhaustion, reviewability, political
question - which serve the same functions ascribed to the legal interest version of the standing doctrine. Moreover, so the argument
runs, these concepts are preferable tools since they may focus directly
upon the underlying issues. "
Of these concepts, particular emphasis has been given to reviewability. Efforts have already been made to expand and elaborate
upon the elements of reviewability in order to make it a more effective tool with which to discriminate between justiciable and nonjusticiable cases. Justices Brennan and White would modify the tra47 Cf. Davis, supra note 3, at 468, 472-73, where Professor Davis emphasizes the
"legitimacy" and "deservingness" of the affected interest.
48
See text accompanying note 41 supra.
49
See note 14 supra & accompanying text.
5
0oSee L. JAFFE, supra note 10, at 522-24.
51 Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 17375 (1970) (Brennan & White, J.J., concurring and dissenting). See also Davis, supra
note 3, at 469.
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ditional notion of reviewability - whether agency action is conclusive and beyond judicial review by anyone - to include a second
requirement, namely, whether the particular plaintiff requesting review may have it." The Justices, although admitting such a modification will necessarily entail an anticipatory review of the merits,53
justify the application of this new notion of reviewability on two
counts. First, they contend that adoption of the new concepts of
standing and reviewability offer an approach whereby each may be
treated separately, and the "often complex questions" involved therein may be squarely dealt with.54 Second, they are unfavorably impressed with the use of "standing to slam the courthouse door against
plaintiffs who are entitled to full consideration of their claims on the
merits."5 5
It would appear, however, that the proffered shift in emphasis to
reviewability - serving merely to accommodate adoption of an injury in fact approach to standing - is unfounded and meaningless.
The question of reviewability seems to be no less permeated by anticipatory considerations of the merits than the discredited legal interest
doctrine of standing. Under the legal interest approach, anticipation
of the merits occurred when the court sought to establish whether
the "right invaded [was] a legal right - one of property, one arising
out of contract, one protected against tortious invasion, or one
founded on a statute which confers a privilege."5 The BrennanWhite proposal focuses upon essentially the same issue under the
rubric of reviewability; the court must seek to establish whether
"Congress intended the plaintiff's class to be a beneficiary of the
statute under which the plaintiff raises his claim. '57 The distinction
between a legal interest and a58beneficiary status conferred by Congress is, if anything, evanescent.
U.S. at 169 n.2.
53 Id.at 175. The Justices argue, however, that the evidence needed to establish the
plaintiff's class as a statutory beneficiary is less than that needed to establish the plaintiff's
claim on the merits. Id. at 175-76. See Abbott Labs. v.Gardner, 387 U.S. 136
(1967).
54397 U.S. at 176-77.
52 397

55 Id. at 178.
5

6Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118, 137-38 (1939); see note 7
$upra.
For opposing views concerning the legal interest test, compare 3 K. DAVIS, supra
note 14, § 22.04, at 216-23 (1958) and Davis, supra note 3, at 458-59, with L.JAFFE,
supra note 10, at 522-24.
57 397 U.S. at 174.
58
.As an initial proposition, it would seem that conferral of a beneficiary status engenders a legal interest and vice versa. For a detailed discussion of the notion of legal
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In all deference to Justices Brennan and White, the legal interest
approach to standing seems to provide the most direct route to the
heart of the "complex questions" involving court review of administrative action.59 In most cases, the complainant is claiming for
himself a substantive right against the state and the violation thereof
by the administrative authorities. The legal interest approach forces
the court, at the outset, to deal with the gist of the complaint: Does
a particular statute evince a legislative intent to protect the complainant from competition from governmental or private enterprise?" ° Does a statutory welfare program, when read in conjunction with the Constitution, create a right to welfare?61 Do farmers
have rights to subsidies and students rights to scholarships?62 Do
private schools have rights to federal assistance?"' Once the court
resolves these issues of statutory construction, it can turn to the
separate, narrower merits of the controversy: Assuming a right
exists, was the plaintiff a holder of such right, and if so, was his right
interest, see L. JAFFE, supra note 10, at 486-89, 508-11. See also Jaffe, supra note 4, at
634-37. A detailed analysis of the various possible relationships between the state and
the individual can be found in 1 WOLFF, VERWALTUNGSRECHT § 43 (6th ed. 1965).
The efficacy of the reviewability doctrine as a tool for discriminating between justiciable and nonjusticiable controversies is further weakened by the establishment of
broad presumptions governing reviewability. See Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S.
136 (1967) (the Court established a presumption in favor of review which could be
defeated only by clear legislative intent to the contrary).
59 See, e.g., Professor Jaffe's adroit use of the legal interest concept L JAFFE, supra
note 10, at 486-88 ("legal interest" as a shorthand expression for certain longstanding
priorities among political and economic values); id. at 508-14 (the various origins of
legal interests in public law); id. at 518-21 (the relationship between legal interest and
administrative competency, discussed in connection with Philco Corp. v. FCC, 257 F.2d
656 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 946 (1959)). For a discussion of the use
of the concept in West German administrative law, see Dugan, supra note 10, at 498-515.
60
See National Ass'n of Secs. Dealers, Inc. v. SEC, 420 F.2d 83, 96-97 (D.C. Cir.
1969), vacated on other grounds, 39 U.S.L.W. 4406 (U.S. Apr. 5, 1971) (Bazelon,

J., concurring).
61 See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 258-60 (1970) (inadequacy of procedures in
connection with termination of welfare benefits). In addition to Goldberg, there are
other cases which portend the genesis of a constitutional right to a sustenance level of
state support. See, e.g., Lewis v. Martin, 397 U.S. 552 (1970); King v. Smith, 392 U.S.
309 (1968) (invalidity of man-in-the-house restrictions upon welfare eligibility); Escalera v. New York City Housing Authority, 425 F.2d 853 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 853 (1970) (challenge to procedures followed in termination of welfare tenancy
on grounds of "nondesirability"). Although many of these cases focus on procedural
issues, it is possible to interpret them as tending to establish a virtual nonterminable
right to welfare benefits. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, supra at 274-76 (Black, J., dissenting).
62 Litigation of such rights is already commonplace in welfare systems only slightly
more advanced than our own. See Dugan, supra note 10, at 508-10 (dealing with
West German administrative law).
63 This issue was indirectly litigated in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
It
has been expressly litigated in West Germany. See Dugan, supra note 10, at 509-11.
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wrongfully violated by the particular administrative act in question?
In this manner, one can construct a rational procedure which insures
a degree of specificity and adverseness sufficient to satisfy the case or
controversy requirement without any explicit reference to the notion
of injury in fact."
Certainly the legal interest version of the standing doctrine is no
less amenable to profound policy considerations than are the standards for reviewability. 5 And the injury in fact approach to standing
mitigates the complexity of review, if at all, only by postponing consideration of the crucial substantive issues to some later point in
time, presumably until the court undertakes to resolve the issue of
reviewability. As discussed below, this deferral of substantive questions is far less innocuous than it may appear. Finally, the "slamming-door" criticism of the legal interest test is also misdirected.
There is no assurance that the courts will be less cavalier in their use
of the now expanded concept of reviewability than they were in their
application of the violated right approach to standing.
IV
The ascendency of injury in fact as the dominant element of the
standing doctrine has also brought in its wake increased reference
to the notion of "public interest." 66 The discredited legal interest
standard, in contrast, generally precluded reference to public interest
in connection with determination of the standing issue, the existence
of the requisite legal interest being derived primarily from a specific statutory or common law source.
As soon as the courts cut loose from the violated right standard,
it was inevitable that public interest considerations would be brought
to bear upon the standing issue. Any administrative act sets into
64

For example, the West German law of standing is constructed wholly around the
notion of violated right. Dugan, supra note 10, at 497-503. This approach also comports with Professor Jaffe's view that injury in fact is largely an irrelevant consideration
in connection with standing problems. L. JAFFE, supra note 10, at 522-24.
05 See note 59 supra.
66 The emphasis on public interest appears in the first cases [Scripps-Howard Radio,
Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 15 (1942); FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470,
475-77 (1940)] cited in support of the injury in fact standard. 3 K DAVIS, supra note
14, § 22.04, at 220. The cases involved competitors' challenges against FCC licensing
procedure.
For more recent examples of public interest litigation, see Citizens Comm. for Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 425 F.2d 97, 103-04 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 949 (1970);
National Ass'n of Secs. Dealers, Inc. v. SEC, 420 F.2d 83, 99-100 (D.C. Cir. 1969),
vacated on other grounds, 39 U.S.L.W. 4406 (U.S. Apr. 5, 1971); Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1002-05 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
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motion an infinitely long chain of events which may be perceived as
adverse by parties far removed, both spatially and temporally, from
the act. For example, the Comptroller's ruling in Data Processing
was not only adverse in respect to the data processing organizations,
but it also posed a threat to those who supplied labor and machines
to the data firms. Furthermore, prior to the Comptroller's ruling
there were probably banks which relied upon less sophisticated means
of data processing. For these banks, the Comptroller's decision
makes feasible a scale of operation which justifies acquisition of a
large computer, with a resultant loss of customers to suppliers of the
less sophisticated data processing equipment. Second-order suppliers
will also suffer, albeit to a lesser degree. The Comptroller's decision
opened a billion dollar business for the banks - the resulting dislocations, both adverse and beneficial, reverberate throughout society
far into the future.
The same holds true in connection with other administrative acts
which frequently come under attack. Consider, for instance, the
dislocations caused by freeway construction through or between urban areas, 67 the construction of large-scale power facilities,68 or experiments which alter the environmentY9 These events produce an
effect in fact upon millions of people. The aggrieved in fact approach to standing would make each and every affected party a
potential plaintiff. As discussed above, in order to realize the purported advantage of the injury in fact approach (nonanticipation of
the merits of the controversy), the courts must in theory adopt a
70
solipsistic definition of injury.
In discarding the legal interest test and adopting, in its place, an
extremely open-ended definition of injury in fact, the courts open
wide the courthouse doors. And under the recent presumptions regarding reviewability, 71 those doors have been all but ripped away.
The lack of a personal legal interest and palpable injury no longer
preclude the plaintiff from demanding a consideration on the merits.
In addition, the new approach permits certain individuals or groups
67

See, e.g., Citizens Comm. for Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 949 (1970).
68
See, e.g., Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir.

1965).
69 See, e.g., Crowther v. Seaborg, 312 F. Supp. 1205 (D. Colo. 1970) (residents and
conservation groups challenge AEC use of nuclear explosive and subsequent gas flaring
in a gas exploration project).
70 See notes 43-44 supra & accompanying text.
71
See note 58 supra.
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of individuals, in the guise of public interest crusaders, to litigate
whatever they may deem to be obnoxious administrative action.
The public interest plaintiff usually appears in one of two contexts. First, he may ostensibly be trying to vindicate the interests of
primary beneficiaries who, for some reason, will not or cannot challenge the particular administrative act. 2 This category of plaintiffs
is exemplified by the recent cases attacking the authority of national
banks to enter into related fields of activity. 3 In National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. v. SEC,7 4 for example, standing was
granted to a third party whose private interests [freedom from competition] were quite different from those of the primary beneficiaries.
The recent conservation disputes have spurred the appearance of
the second kind of public interest plaintiff. These cases involve administrative action under statutes which require the weighing of
amorphous factors such as aesthetic value, public safety, and
public interest.75 The subject matter of these cases - unlike the
72

This kind of appearance has been used in litigating constitutional issues. See, e.g.,
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961) and Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44 (1943)
(whether physician can asseit patient's right to attack a statute forbidding contraceptives); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (whether private school can assert the constitutional right of parents to raise and educate their children). See discussion in 3 K. DAvIS, supra note 14, § 22.06, at 226-29.
73 See Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970)
(discussed in note 3 supra); National Ass'n of Secs. Dealers, Inc. v. SEC, 420 F.2d 83
(D.C. Cit. 1969), vacated on other grounds, 39 U.S.L.W. 4406 (U.S. Apr. 5, 1971)
(whether national banks can operate open end mutual funds for their customers);
Saxon v. Georgia Ass'n of Independent Ins. Agents, Inc., 399 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1968)
(whether national banks can act as insurance agents in communities having over 5,000
inhabitants); Baker, Watts & Co. v. Saxon, 261 F. Supp. 247 (D.D.C. 1966), afd
sub nom. Port of New York Authority v. Baker, Watts & Co., 392 F.2d 497 (D.C.
Cir. 1968) (whether banks can underwrite revenue bonds other than those issued by
the government).
74 420 F.2d 83 (D.C. Cir. 1969), vacated on other grounds, 39 U.S.L.W. 4406
(U.S. Apr. 5, 1971). Discussing the standing problems involved in the case, Chief
Judge Bazelon noted: "The intended beneficiaries of the banking laws, if the class is
narrower than the public, are the bank customers who have no immediate and compelling interest in litigation to further long-term sound banking." Id. at 99 (concurring
opinion).
75
See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. United States Dep't of Health, Educ.
and Welfare, 428 F.2d 1083 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (use of DDT on agricultural commodities); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
(cancellation of USDA registration of DDT); Citizens Comm. for Hudson Valley v.
Volpe, 425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 949 (1970) (federally-funded
highway construction); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608
(2d Cir. 1965) (construction of hydroelectric power facility); D.C. Federation of Civic
Ass'ns v. Volpe, 316 F. Supp. 754 (D.D.C. 1970) (bridge construction); Crowther v.
Seaborg, 312 F. Supp. 1205 (D. Colo. 1970) (use of nuclear explosives in gas exploration); Triangle Improvement Council v. Ritchie, 314 F. Supp. 20 (S.D.W. Va. 1969),
aff'd per curiam, 429 F.2d 423 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 400 U.S. 963 (1970) (No.
712) (highway construction).
A second group of cases in which this type of public interest appears as a normative
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usual subject matter of legal obligations arising from contract, tort,
or property ownership - cannot be readily allocated to a particular
person or group. Under such circumstances, the traditional standing
tests - based either on legal interest or injury in fact or a combination of both - tend to break down. With such "goods" lacking a
well defined "allocatory content," 6 their intangible nature renders
awkward an application of any but the most solipsistic definitions
of injury in fact. Likewise, in the absence of a unique class of individuals who possess or are entitled to an interest in such goods,7"
the legal interest standard is also difficult to apply. Consequently,
courts tend to cut loose from both approaches to the standing problem. Plaintiffs are afforded standing to vindicate the public's interest in the particular intangible good, as well as the public's interest
in the maintenance of administrative conduct which conforms with
the relevant statute.7 8 Those courts which demand an injury in fact
are generally satisfied with the complainant's investment in the litigation of these cases, which is thought to insure the requisite degree
of adversity under the case or controversy clause.7'9 Those courts
which insist upon a violated right, or legal interest approach, generally view the complainant as a private attorney general who is vindicating the public's interest in gesetzkonform behavior on the part of
its officials.80
V
There is much to commend public interest litigation; both historical and comparative precedents exist for the practice.8 As an
element of the new notion of standing, however, the doctrine now
becomes a combination, mirabile dictu, of two undefined legal terms
concept involves broadcast licensing. See, e.g., Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316
U.S. 4 (1942); FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940); Office of
Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 944 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
76 For a discussion of the concept of "allocatory content" and its relationship to the
problem of standing, see Dugan, supra note 10, at 518-19.
77
See Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-Hohieldian or
Ideological Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 1033, 1036 (1968).
78 These two themes recur throughout the cases cited in note 75 supra.
79 See, e.g., Citizens Comm. for Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 425 F.2d 97, 103 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, U.S. 949 (1970); Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v.
FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1006 (D.C. Cir. 1966). See also Jaffe, supra note 77, at 1038.
80 See, e.g., Citizens Comm. for Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 425 F.2d 97, 102 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 949 (1970) (state administrator failed to obtain congressional
approval for construction of highway along federal waterway).
81
See L. JAFFE, supra note 10, at 463-74.
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(injury in fact, public interest), one patent fiction (the publicspiritedness of the complainant), and one dubious prediction (the
likelihood of increased judicial relief). Enough has been said about
the difficulties inherent in the notion of injury in fact as an element
of the standing doctrine, 82 and the inadequacies of public interest as
a normative concept have been eloquently described elsewhere.8 3 In

the present context, the Brennan-White-Davis formula for standing
might be interpreted to read: A complainant who alleges an injury
in fact has standing if it is in the public interest that he litigate
the injury. As discussed above, there can be no meaningful limitations present in the term "injury in fact" if the standing requirement
is to avoid any consideration of the merits.8" The concept of "public

interest" is equally void of legal significance. It is nothing more or
less than an euphemism used to conceal definite preconceptions about
the desirability of specific social behavior and allocation of resources.85
When employed in connection with access to judicial review, the notion of public interest can be expanded and contracted, almost at will,
by reference to other catchwords in the vocabulary of justiciability
such as "spurious suits," "requisite degree of adversity," and "ripeness." 8 It is possible that someday substantive content may be imported into the notion of public interest; however, judging from the
erratic case law in other areas where public interest has become a
substantive criterion, such content has been more sensitive to the87national mood than to the application of a specific statutory norm.
82

See text accompanying notes 35-41, 47-58 supra.
See ReichThe Law of the Planned Society, 75 YALE LJ. 1227, 1233-37, 123940 (1966).
84
See text accompanying notes 42-50 supra.
85
See Reich, supra note 83, at 1234, 1239.
86
See, e.g., Toilet Goods Ass'n, Inc. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158 (1967), where the
Court manipulated the "ripeness" doctrine to defeat review of an HEW order which
authorized the Secretary to suspend certification of persons who refused FDA employees
free access to manufacturing facilities, processes, and formulae. See Justice Fortas' caustic and illuminating dissent, joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justice Clark, id. at
174. See also Hahn v. Gottlieb, 430 F.2d 1243 (1st Cir. 1970) (the court manipulated
a presumption favoring review [Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967)] to
avoid review of FHA approval of a rent increase for federally subsidized housing); Dorothy Thomas Foundation, Inc. v. Hardin, 317 F. Supp. 1072 (W.D.N.C. 1970) (in
an attack upon the Secretary of Agriculture's decision to permit timber harvest in a national forest, the court avoided reaching the merits by juggling the burden of proof under
the review provisions of section 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706
(Supp. V, 1970) ); Triangle Improvement Council v. Ritchie, 314 F. Supp. 20 (S.D.W.
Va. 1969), aff'd per curiam, 429 F.2d 423 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 400 U.S. 963
(1970) (No. 712) (the court relied upon laches to bar displacees' challenge to highway construction through low income area).
87 This has been especially evident in connection with first amendment problems.
For example, the "contemporary community standard" aspect of the Roth test for ob83
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When courts combine the notion of public interest with the presently undefined concept of injury in fact, the result is an almost
absolute discretionary control over access to the courts.18 Today the
doors are open for conservationists: Tomorrow? The new approach
to standing no doubt symbolizes "the trend .. toward enlargement
of the class of people who may protest administrative action;" 8
however, at the same time it isolates the court from the merits of
the case. Under the legal interest approach, the courts were forced,
at the very outset, to weigh meaty substantive issues: Does a particular statute create a right against certain types of competition, a substantive right to a welfare benefit, a right to participate in the administrative process ? The injury in fact approach, on the other
hand, permits the courts to postpone and, in many cases, completely avoid these difficult problems of statutory interpretation.
Having found the complainant to be injured in fact (which is always
possible), the court can turn immediately to the procedural aspects
of the case. Noncompliance with any of the complex rules governing hearings, ripeness, notice, or effective representation, will doom
the controversy to remand, or to another round, or series of rounds, at
the administrative level. 91 Although the legal interest test may have
precluded a number of plaintiffs, it did not enable the courts to put
litigants on a procedural yo-yo. A greater incidence of judicial
relief can be achieved only by an increase in the number and kinds
of substantive rights which the individaul has with respect to the
state. The judicial process must be geared to the vindication of these
scenity [Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 488-89 (1957)) explicitly anticipates the
instability deplored by Justice Harlan in A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of
a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney Gen., 383 U.S. 413, 455 (1966) (dissenting opinion). Although it is arguable that, with Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), and
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968), the Supreme Court is achieving a stabler
and more absolute protection of allegedly obscene expression [see Engdahl, Requiem
for Roth: Obscenity Doctrine is Changing, 68 MICI. L. REV. 186-200 (1969)), other
forms of expression are being subject to new restrictions imposed by way of the conspiracy doctrine. See Note, Conspiracy and the First Amendment, 79 YAiE L.J. 872
(1970).
88
This discretion isalready latent insofar as the standing doctrine derives from the
policy of judicial self-restraint. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 97 (1968); Whitley
v. Wilson City Bd. of Educ., 427 F.2d 179, 183 (4th Cir. 1970) (Sobeloff, J., concurring).
Professor Jaffe also makes specific allowance for the role of discretion in connection
with questions of standing. L. JAFFE, supra note 10, at 524-28.
89Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153
(1970).
90 See notes 59-63 supra & accompanying text.
91
See Toilet Goods Ass'n v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158, 183-200 (1967) (Fortas, J.,
dissenting). See note 86 supra & accompanying text.
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rights rather than to preoccupation with the shuffling and reshuffling
of procedural labels.
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